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COGNITIVE DIFFERENTIATION AND TRAIT ANXIETY 
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George T 0 Brennan 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest 
among personality investigators in a cognitive orientation to 
personality. Several theorists and researchers have begun to 
relate the study of cognition and "cognitive structures" to 
personality dynamics (Suedfield, 1971) and to personality 
development (Bieri, 1966). Suedfield <1971) and Bieri (1966) 
noted the lack of systematic, intensive research into relation­
ships among cognitive personality variables, but their articles 
portend an increase in such investigations.
Three areas of interest in cognitive-personality research 
provide the investigative framework for the proposed study. 
These are (a) interpersonal cognitive complexity (Bieri, 1961; 
Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Leaman, Miller, & Tripodi, 1966); (b) 
Conceptual Systems Theory (Harvey, Hunt, & Schroder, 1961); 
and (c) trait anxiety (Spielberger, 1966).
Bieri (I96I) introduced the term “cognitive complexity" 
in reference to the amount of differentiation among the dimen­
sions of a person*s cognitive structure. Cognitive structure 
refers to the "relatively enduring patterns of organization in 
the person*s representation of the social and physical environ­
ment [Bieri et al., 1966, p. 1ZJ ."
A person who has numerous, well-differentiated constructs 
to construe and represent his social world is considered cog-
nitively complex, while a person with relatively few dimen­
sions and with little discriminability among them is consi­
dered to have a ,,simple, cognitive structure. As a measure 
of cognitive complexity (differentiation), Bieri et al.,
(1966) developed a version of Kelly*s (1955) Bole Construct 
Repertoire (REP) test.
. A second theoretical approach to structural complexity 
emphasizes the integration of differentiated dimensions (e.g., 
Harvey et al., 1961; Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967).
This position has been most prominently represented by the 
Conceptual Systems Theory of Harvey et al. (I96I). Conceptual 
Systems Theory (CST) is a conceptualization of individual 
differences in cognitive structure, emphasizing integrative 
complexity "as a synthesis of specialized functions, similar 
to the Hegelian synthesis of thesis and antithesis [Streufert 
& Fromkin, 1972, p. 15*0 •”
Specifically, according to CST, an individual is thought 
to develop conceptually (given optimal environmental condi­
tions) by passing through a series of four systems of cogni­
tive functioning (conceptual levels), ranging from highly 
concrete modes of thinking to highly abstract' modes (Harvey 
et al., 1961).
Harvey (1970) described this concreteness-abstractness 
dimension as
...a quality of how the individual articulates and organ­
izes or differentiates and integrates his concepts of 
ego-involving content (Harvey, 1967; Felknor & Harvey, 
1970; Harvey et al., 1961)« Concreteness-abstractness
3refers to a superordinate conceptual dimension which 
encompasses a number of more molecular organizational 
attributes, such as degree of differentiation, extent 
of integration, and centrality of the conceptual ele­
ments. Thus variation in concreteness-abstractness 
rests upon differences in patterning and organization 
and not on differences in the algebraic sum of these 
subordinate characteristics £*p. 69J.
Complete theoretical descriptions of the four systems 
of conceptual complexity may be found in Harvey et al. (1961), 
while summaries of their empirical descriptions and corre­
lates were included in Harvey (19.66) and in Greaves (1971a). 
Very briefly, the systems may be described as follows: 
System 1 persons are cognitively simple and concrete, 
use extreme judgments, are rigid, unable to change set readi­
ly, oblivious to subtle cues, dogmatically obedient to persons 
of high status and authority, and remain rigidly tied to ex­
ternally defined sets of rules for social behavior.
System 2 persons are somewhat more differentiated and 
integrated than System 1 representatives. System 2 persons 
tend to distrust and dogmatically oppose social institutions. 
They generally dwell on the negative aspects of authority, 
choosing to remain closed to any potential good it may have.
System 3 persons have been described by Harvey (1970) 
as being
...more abstract, less dogmatic, less pro- or anti- 
establishment, and less evaluative than individuals from 
either System 1 or System 2. At the same time they are 
more concerned with interpersonal harmony, empathic 
understanding, mutual dependencies, and highly developed 
skills of interpersonal manipulation aimed at averting 
social isolation, aloneness, interpersonal rejection 
and failure when having to perform alone [p. 713®
System 4 Is the most abstract of the four systems.
Persons at this level may be characterized by “high task 
orientation9 information-seeking* low dogmatism, creativity 
(in the sense of offering problem solutions that are high in 
both novelty and appropriateness), openness to inputs from 
diverse sources and a high independence of judgment {^Harvey,
1970, pp. 71-72] ."
Assessment of these conceptual systems has been accomp­
lished with several measures: the Paragraph Completion Test 
(PCT) (Schroder et al., 196?); the Interpersonal Topical 
Inventory (ITI) (Tuckman, 1966).; and the This-I-Believe (TIB) 
test (Harvey, 1964, 1965, 1966; White & Harvey, 1965). Har­
vey (1970) also developed an objective instrument, but 
Greaves (1971a) concluded that the TIB is the “better of the 
two •"
The relationship between differentiation and integration
has been a source of theoretical and empirical confusion
in the study of cognitive complexity. Streufert and Fromkin
(1972) noted that although the two approaches seem to agree
that differentiation is a precondition for integration, they
do not appear to agree that integration is necessarily (always)
associated with differentiation.
Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, and Karp (1962) state 
that development toward greater differentiation must be 
accompanied by successively more complex reintegration 
of the (perceptual or decision-making) system. Theorists 
who are more concerned with integration (e.g., Harvey et 
al., 1961) view differentiation as a necessary but quite 
insufficient precondition for integration [Streufert & 
Fromkin, 1972, p. 154*7.
5Adams-Webber (1970a), elaborating Kelly*s personal con­
struct theory, noted that some persons (especially schizo­
phrenics) might be highly.differentiated but have little or 
no functional integration, resulting in a level of experience 
which is “hopelessly kaleidoscopic and discontinuous £p* 37H«,! 
He concluded that ,!it cannot be differentiation alone which 
determines the level of functioning of a construct system, 
but rather the progressive differentiation and reintegration 
of substructures at increasingly higher levels of abstrac­
tion [p. 37J . m
This description of the relationship between differentia­
tion and integration is most consistent with the theoretical 
position proscribed by CST* According to Harvey et al. (1961) 
and Schroder et al. (1967), cognitive differentiation should 
increase through the first three systems types (and through 
the initial transition into System 4), but at System 4, struc-
4
tural integration and articulation become crucial.
Whatever the actual relationship between differentiation 
and integration, one would expect some positive correlation 
between personality measures of the two concepts. Harvey 
(1966) reported a positive linear relationship between con­
ceptual level (CL) scores on the TIB and differentiation scores 
on a modified REP test. Brennan* found a similar relationship 
between)TIB scores and differentiation scores on a test similar 
to one used by Crockett (1965). These relationships were found 
by simply noting that System 4 Ss had the highest mean differ­
entiation scores, followed, in descending order, by Systems 3$
62, and 1. However, Brennan found a correlation coefficient 
of only +.21 between the two measures* Other studies (see 
Streufert & Fromkin, 1972) have also shown little correla­
tional relationship between measures of structural integra­
tion (like the TIB and POT) and.Bieri1s modified HEP test of 
differentiation* Factorial studies by Vannoy (1965) (who 
reported a correlation of +.05 between the PCT and Bieri*s 
test) and others (e.g., Faletti, 1968; Gardiner, 1968) have 
shown measures of integration (PCT, ITI, TIB) to define a 
factor "relatively unrelated to cognitive differentiation 
[Schroder, 1971, p. 259U*H addition, Harvey, Reich, and 
Wyer (1968) found that concrete (Systems 1 and 2 combined) 
and abstract (Systems 3 and ^ combined) Ss did not differ 
significantly in differentiation scores.
Apparently, the two kinds of complexity tests measure 
unique facets of cognitive structure. When the tests are 
paired, integrators produce fewer dimensions on the REP test, 
and differentiators score moderately low on a test of CL, 
since such a test is primarily geared to measure degrees of 
integration (Streufert & Fromkin, 1972, p. 15*0•
A third area of interest in cognitive-personality re­
search involves a specific structural tendency (see Schroder, 
1971) of individual conceptual systems— manifest or trait 
anxiety. Trait anxiety has been defined (Spielberger, 1966) 
as an individual's anxiety-proneness— i.e., his predisposi­
tion to experience a state of anxiety in response to threat­
ening stimuli. Anxiety as a personality trait has been
7typically investigated on the basis of scores on the Taylor 
(1953) -Manifest Anxiety Scale ( M S ) e Two scales which have 
been shown to be highly related to the MAS are the Byrne 
(196^) Bepression-Sensitization (R-S) Scale (r=+*91> Joy,
1963; Sullivan & Roberts, 1969) the Millimet (1970)
Manifest Anxiety-Defensiveness (MAD) Scale (r=+.92 for both 
males and females, Millimet, 1970),
These three scales treat various aspects of an indivi­
duals affective-motivational states as reflected by a true- 
false questionnaire. The scale questions ask the person to 
admit to or assess the amount of emotional or physical dis­
comfort he typically experiences. The assumption is that if 
a person admits to a considerable number of mental and physi­
cal difficulties, then anxiety and defensive style must play 
a role in determining his behavior.
Though the R-S and MAD scales are nearly identical (r=.9^ 
for males,r=.97 for females, Millimet & Cohen, 1973),
Byrne and Millimet have disagreed over interpretation of in­
dividual scoreso Byrne conceptualized the R-S dimension in 
terras of a person*s characteristic defensive mode of response 
to threatening stimuli, ranging from repressive-denying modes 
of defense (Repression) to obsessive-compulsive ones (Sensi­
tization) . Millimet (1970, 1972), on the other hand, suggested 
that two factors account for MAD scores: trait anxiety and 
defensiveness (ability to avoid threatening stimuli). These 
two factors are presumed to vary inversely, with low scorers 
(repressors) being low in anxiety with high avoidance ability
oand high scorers (sensitizers) being high in anxiety and low 
in avoidance ability*
Support for Millimet^ interpretation was provided by 
Warr and Knapper (1968) who cited several studies (Altrocchi,
1961; GordonP 1957; Lazarus, Erikson, & Fonda, 1951) which 
indicated that a repressor is a person who does not (or can­
not) express recognition of threatening or unpleasant aspects 
of his life; he is one who scores high on defensiveness scales 
but low on manifest anxiety* Conversely, sensitizers express 
more emotional stress, scoring low on defensiveness and high 
on manifest anxiety*
Moreover, Millimet (1970) argued that, among the three 
scales (R-S, MAS, MAD), uthe MAD scale appears to be the most 
suitable alternative* Not only does the MAD scale reflect the 
highest factor loadings and exhibit higher estimates of relia­
bility among these scales, but the development of a form for 
males and a form for females removes the possibility of con­
founding scale content with sex {jpp. 613-61*0*'*
Accordingly, the MAD scale was used in the study reported 
here* Since defensiveness was not an issue in the present 
study, the interpretation of MAD scores was confined to an 
estimation of trait anxiety*
The relationship between trait anxiety and cognitive 
complexity has been a subject of recent theoretical and re­
search interest* It has been suggested (Bieri, 1971; Warr & 
Knapper, 1968; Stotland & Canon, 1972) that trait anxiety and 
cognitive complexity (dlfferentiation) are positively correlated,
9possibly due to the larger number of alternative ways of 
perceiving available to the more complex individual. In 
other words, a person with a greater number of concept di­
mensions with which to construe his environment is theoreti­
cally more likely to perceive conflicting (and hence poten­
tially threatening) stimuli, and thus he is more susceptible 
to trait anxiety.
The relationship between trait anxiety and cognitive 
complexity has been investigated by several recent studies 
(e.g., Bergquist, 1970; Lewinsohn, Flippo, & Bergquist,
1970; Wilkins, Epting, & Van De Riet, 1972). The results of 
these investigations reflect an inconsistency similar to that 
found in the research with differentiation and integration. 
The studies cited indicate a positive relationship between 
trait anxiety (as measured by the R-S scale) and various 
measures of cognitive complexity. Wilkins et al.,(l972) 
reported that sensitizers and neutrals were both higher in 
differentiation scores than repressors. However, Bieri et 
al. (1966) reported a correlation coefficient of only -.16 
between trait anxiety (MAS) and scores on Bieri*s test of 
differentiation.
Again, this apparent inconsistency might be attributable 
to characteristics of the different tests used. However, it 
is doubtful that the solution to this problem will be that
simple. The thesis of this study was that these differences 
might be better understood when placed in the context of Con­
ceptual Systems Theory. Before elaboration of that, thesis,
a more extensive consideration should be given to the study 
by. Wilkins et al. (1972), the most recent and relevant published 
study relating trait anxiety and cognitive differentiation©
in addition to the hypothesized linear relationship 
between trait anxiety (R-S) and cognitive complexity, the 
Wilkins study sought confirmation of a “vigilance hypothesis® 
of interpersonal relations: ean individual differentiates more 
finely among negative, anxiety-evoking stimuli persons in order 
to gain greater understanding and predictability concerning ♦©♦ 
potentially dangerous individuals £p* 45oJ.H
In the Wilkins study, 82 undergraduate Ss were administered 
the R-S scale and divided up into three groups: repressors (n=2^) 
below the 25th percentile; sensitizers (|i-15) above the 75th 
percentile; and neutrals (r&bj) between these two points©
The Sc then completed the interpersonal cognitive complexity 
grid (Bieri ©t al©, 1966)* Each S named 10 persons from his 
social environment t© fit preselected role categories and then 
rated each stimulus person along 10 bi-polar dimensions (e.g., 
outgoing-shy) on a scale ranging from -3 to *3 with no 0 
value© Complexity scores resulted from comparison of ratings 
(points scored for agreement of ratings)© The results, as 
reported by Wilkins et al© (1972), are summarized in Table*!.
Insert Table I about here
Since agreement between ratings indicates functional 
overlap of construct dimensions, low total scores indicate
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cognitive complexity (high differentiation) and high scores 
indicate cognitive simplicity (low differentiation)• A sig­
nificant difference was found between scores at the three 
R-S levels (£= &£= 2/79, £ <.025). Multiple com­
parisons revealed that both neutrals and sensitizers were 
more complex in terms of differentiation scores than were 
repressors* In other words, Ss middle and high in trait 
anxiety were significantly better than low scorers in being 
able to differentiate persons in their interpersonal envi­
ronment o Over all Ss, negative role categories were differ­
entiated significantly more than positive role categories*
Thus, both major hypotheses were supported by the data*
Upon close analysis and comparison with related studies, 
however, several problems become apparent with the Wilkins 
study. Three possible problem areas should be considered:
(a) attitude direction and intensity, (b) measurement proper­
ties of the two instruments used, and (c) selection of the 
sample population.
First, although the direction of Ss* attitudes was varied, 
a neutral category was not used, negating the possibility of 
looking at potential differences as a result of different 
intensities of attitude. Harvey, Reich, and Wyer (1968) 
investigated the interaction of attitude direction and inten­
sity upon cognitive differentiationo Their results indicated 
that attitude direction (positive-negative) had no significant 
effect on responding, as the neutral category produced more 
differentiation than either of the other two categories.
12
Furthermore, intensity of attitude was found to be a signifi­
cant factor affecting differentiation.
These contradictory results bring the “vigilance” hypo­
thesis into question. This area of investigation has been 
widely explored, with mixed results. In addition to the 
Wilkins study, several others Xe.g., Harvey, Wyer, & Hauta- 
luoma, 1963; Irwin, Tripodi, & Bieri, 196?; Miller & Bieri, 
1965) have found that stimuli associated with negative affect 
are differentiated best. On the other hand, Crockett (1965) 
cited a study by Supnick (196^) which found liked persons to 
be better differentiated than disliked persons— i.e., positive 
stimuli persons were more easily differentiated than negative 
stimuli persons. Irwin et al. (1967) noted that the con­
flicting results reported by Crockett may have been due to the 
fact that a different method of measuringcognitive complexity 
was used.
In either case, the results of Harvey, Reich, and Wyer 
(1968) seriously question the validity of results from studies 
which have not considered attitude intensity. It appears 
that when intensity is controlled for (as in Harvey et al., 
1968), the effect of attitude direction vanishes.
A second potential problem with the Wilkins study in­
volves a measurement property apparently shared by the two 
instruments used. Byrne's R-S scale has been repeatedly 
shown to be strongly tied to social desirability (Abbott, 1972; 
Bemhardson, 196?; Silber & Grebstein, 1964*; Millimet, 1970, 
1972; and others), with the correlation usually stronger than
-•90 low scores on th© R-S scale are associated with
socially desirable response'sets). Socially desirable re­
sponse sets have also been shown to be negatively associated 
with cognitive complexity as measured by Bieri8s differentia­
tion test (Bieri, 1965, 1971; Vannoy, 1965)* In an effort 
to minimise the effects of response set, Vannojr (1965) used 
a modified version of Bierirs test* Vannoy found that the 
difference in response set correlations between the original 
and modified versions indicated a reduction in potential 
response set confounding for the modified version* Since 
both the R-S measure and Bieri1s test contain this potentially 
confounding element, such a modification as that used by 
Vannoy seemed useful and was employed in the present study*
A third area of possible concern has to do with the 
selection of the subject population* Greaves (1971a, 1972) 
stressed the need for controlling for systematic cognitive 
differences by selecting Ss on the basis of conceptual level, 
as defined by Conceptual Systems Theory.
Greaves (197.1a) reviewed the relevant facets of CST and 
their Implications for research in cognitive psychology* He 
suggested that the empirical evidence supporting CST has in­
dicated that the theory can predict differential results in 
cognitive tasks as a function of CL. He pointed out that CST 
“demonstrates *•• that there are major, systematic subgroup 
differences present in many experiments, which have 
heretofore been treated as random differences [p. 58]."
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Greaves also noted that the four conceptual systems are not 
normally distributed in any given (randomly selected) popu­
lation* Harvey (1970) reported the following distribution 
of system.; types among several thousand liberal-arts college 
students: System 1, 35$; System 2, 15$; System 3, 20$; and
System 4, 7$ (the rest were mixed or transitional types)*
Greaves (1971a) concluded that it becomes very difficult to 
determine the external validity of results (especially in 
experiments focusing on cognition) when E fails to control 
for cognitive type.
In contrast to Wilkins et al. (1972), the study by Harvey 
et al. (1968) provided an example of differences in result 
which may be attributable to systematic sampling bias. Se­
lecting Ss on the basis of CL (as noted earlier in this paper), 
Harvey et al. (1968) investigated differentiation as a function * 
of both attitude direction and intensity. While the Wilkins 
stucLy showed a significant difference in differentiation 
scores as a function of attitude direction, the Harvey study 
reported no effect of varying regard, but their results did 
show a strong effect for intensity of attitude.
This difference in result may be explained in several 
ways, including: (a) differences in measurement techniques used 
in the two studies, and/or (b) differences in the sample popu­
lation.
The methods of measurement in the studies differed in 
several ways. First, the dimensional differentiation scores 
were elicited by different tests (although both were modifi-
15
cations of the HEP test). Wilkins et al. (1972) provided the 
role categories as used in Bieri*s modification (see earlier 
description). In addition, the dimensions Ss used for judgment 
were provided, i.e., preselected by the B 0 In the Harvey study, 
however, the dimensions used were “social beliefs” and “inter­
personal relations" (instead of stimulus persons), and specific 
beliefs to be rated were selected by the Ss along with the 
dimensions on which they were judged.
Ad&ms-Webber (1970b) discussed the relative merits of 
measuring cognitive complexity with elicited versus provided 
construct dimensions. Drawing from an extensive review of the 
literature, he suggested that “normal subjects, at least, 
exhibit approximately the same degree of differentiation in 
using carefully selected supplied lists of adjectives as • 
when they employ their own elicited constructs [p. 352jf.H 
With respect to the two studies in question, even though there 
were potentially relevant differences, the samples used were 
selected from normal populations.
A more important difference in the measurement procedures 
might have been in the stimuli Ss were required to differentiate. 
Harvey et al. (1968) used beliefs and relations, while Wilkins 
et al. (1972) used stimulus persons assigned to provided role 
categories.
In addition, the differentiation task in the Harvey study 
was a far more complex and-demanding task. In the Wilkins 
study, Ss merely rated each of 10 persons on 10 provided 
dimensions. In Harvey’s study, However, Ss believed they
were participating in the construction of a "perception 
test.” The Ss selected 24 social beliefs (eight each of posi­
tive, negative, and neutral regard) and then rated the® on 
eight attributes they had selected as important in describing 
those beliefs. This procedure was repeated for 2k "inter­
personal relations," so that each S generated 48 stimuli and 
16 attributes and then waded through the resulting grid in 
a rating procedure. Finally, Ss rated the intensity of their 
feelings toward each stimulus domain instance.
Thus, the differences in the demand of the tasks in the 
two studies appears to have been substantial and quite possibly 
affected the results. Accordingly, one purpose of the present 
study was to replicate the study by Harvey et al. (1968), 
substituting a modification of Bieri*s (1966) measure of 
cognitive differentiation.
The major purpose of the present study was to investigate 
the relationships between trait anxiety, cognitive differentia­
tion, and conceptual complexity (integration or concreteness- 
abstractness). This appeared to be a formidable task, as the 
literature on such relationships was small, and the studies 
available (mostly relating R-S to cognitive differentiation) 
were equivocal because of some of the problems discussed here.
An example of this difficulty involves the discussion of 
the relationship between R-S as a measure of "personal 
adjustment" and R-S as it relates to cognitive differentiation.
Millimet (1972) and others (Bergquist, 1970; Byrne, 1964;
1?
Dana & Cocking, 1968) have cited numerous studies indicating 
a strong linear relationship between tendency toward high 
trait anxiety scores and maladjustment. This trend has been 
demonstrated with numerous measures of personal adjustment, 
including the California Personality Inventory (Byrne, Go- 
lightly, & Sheffield, 1965), the Gough and Heilbrun (1965) 
Adjective Check List (Hoffman, 1970), the MMPI (Millimet,
1970), the Hotter (Rotter & Rafferty, 1950) Incomplete Sen­
tences Blank (rf+.73 with the R-S scale, Tempone & Lamb,
1967; „r=+.70 with the MAD scale, Millimet, 1972), and various 
self-description measures (Altrocchi, Parsons, & Dickoff, 
i960; Byrne, 1961; Lucky & Grigg, 1964). In addition, nor­
mal populations have been shown to secore significantly lower 
on measures of trait anxiety than students seeking counseling, 
(Tempone & Lamb, 1967), those seeking therapy (Thelen, 1969), 
and psychiatric patients (Feder, 1967; Millimet, 1970).
Millimet (1972) also noted that several factorial studies 
have established a unitary relationship between trait anxiety 
and general maladjustment or neuroticism (e.g., Bendig, I960; 
Eysenck, 1957; Kassebaum, Couch, & Slater, 1959; LaForge, 1962). 
On the basis of such findings, Sarason (l960) concluded that 
“the scales of anxiety are tapping tendencies toward neuroti­
cism, maladjustment, and self-dissatisfaction Jjp. biojo1
Assuming that both adjustment and cognitive differentiation 
are desirable states for individuals to attain, then these 
results and the previously cited relationship between differen­
tiation and trait anxiety seem to be contradictory. This
18
apparent inconsistency was elaborated by Bergquist (1970) who,
in suggesting an “interpersonal-cognitive approach to the R-S
construct,1 concluded:
Whereas repressors appear to be oriented toward and 
exhibit considerable facility ixi interacting with other 
people, sensitizers are “primed1 toward viewing them­
selves and others in a negative light and exhibit little 
facility in interpersonal activities. The sensitizer 
is described as one who is “alienated1 from other peo­
ple, from society, and even from himselfv In contrast, 
sensitizers rather consistently exhibit greater facility 
than repressors in their cognitive operations upon various 
types of stimuli.— particularly those stimuli which are 
vaguely experienced or complex. Thus while sensitizers 
appear to be less “adjusted1 than repressors in one di­
mension (interpersonal), they appear to be more “adjusted1 
in another (cognitive)[1970, p. ^3
The problem appears to be one of interpretation. It
may be possible to interpret both adjustment and differentiation
as desirable entities. In discussing the common conception
of adjustment, Putney and Putney (196^) cogently argued that:
One of the prevailing assumptions which Americans have 
learned to take for granted is that anxiety is a 'product 
of inadequate adjustment. This may be the case, but it 
is equally likely that anxiety reflects inadequacies in 
the pattern to which the individual attempts to adjust.
The adjusted Individual is one who is able to fit readily 
into the normal patterns of his society, but it cannot 
be taken for granted that one who is adjusted is psycho­
logically healthy. He can be superbly adjusted to his 
culture, normal in every respect, and yet not lead a 
full and satisfying life Jjpp. 7-Sj*
-*•
Thus, it may be that assessing the “adjustment” of an 
individual may be less important than assessing his psycho­
logical health. Research with the R-S dimension has begun to 
point to such considerations. For- example, Weissman and 
Ritter (1970) reported that both sensitizers and neutrals
19
were significantly lower in ego strength (Barron, 1953) than 
repressors, but there were no significant differences between 
sensitizers and neutrals. They concluded that “these find­
ings suggest that sensitizers, while critical, impatient, 
action-oriented, and personally more troubled, also have the 
capacity for personal integration ..<> and for more creative 
potential than previous literature would suggest jjp. 859]*u 
The former, more negative, characteristics are consistent 
with the previously cited findings relating anxiety and ad­
justment (see Millimet, 19?2), but the pattern of differences 
in ego strength provides the basis for a new assessment of 
sensitizers. Weissman and Ritter suggested that "while sen­
sitizers experience more personal turmoil than repressors, are 
less restrained and engage in less socially desirable behaviors, 
that they also have'certain ego strengths (equal to 'normals') 
which provide them with the capacity to effect significant 
and perhaps more creative changes in their relationships with 
others and in their interpersonal environment £l97Q, P* 86^0."
Consistent with Greaves (1971a, 1972), placing the pro­
blem in the framework of Conceptual Systems Theory might 
provide a context in which these conflicting interpretations 
might be better understood. In such a context, as already 
noted, selection of the sample population is of critical 
concern, as the four system types are not equally represented 
in the normal population.
Subject selection in most anxiety/differentiation studies
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is of the "random" variety, usually selecting undergraduate 
college students from the freshman and sophomore classes.
The Wilkins study chose Ss from two upper-division under­
graduate courses using the typical random process* In the 
Harvey study, however, the Ss were selected, as Greaves 
suggested, on the basis of conceptual level (10 Ss at each 
level selected from a larger sample of 150 students). As 
Greaves pointed out, this difference in sampling alone might 
account for the conflicting results noted earlier.
Assuming that the population distribution of CL types 
reported by Harvey (1970) holds true across the colleges 
used, one would expect that randomly selected samples would 
lead to an overrepresentation of the lower levels of CL0 
That is, such samples represent a restricted range of level 
of conceptual functioning. Consequently, inferences from 
such studies must be limited, as the systematic sub-group 
differences in cognitive style are not effectively accounted 
for.
Consideration of the theoretical relationships among the 
variables (CL, trait anxiety, and cognitive differentiation) 
might provide support for Greaves' (1971a) contention that 
CST may provide a framework for resolving such research 
problems. System 1 persons are cognitively simple, undiffer­
entiated, concrete, relatively unaware of their environment, 
quite "adjusted" to the established facets of. the society 
they live in, and are thus relatively free of "anxiety." 
System 2 persons, dogmatically rejecting societal norms and
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seeing little of use or relevance in their interpersonal 
environment, are only slightly more differentiated, much 
less "adjusted," and much more anxious, as a result of per­
ceiving many facets of their world as personally threatening. 
System 3 persons, more highly differentiated, more open to 
the social environment, focused on interpersonal relations, 
and highly sensitive to mutual dependencies and interpersonal 
acceptance, should also experience a high level of anxiety.
As Harvey et al. (1961) stated: "The most direct central
characteristic of extreme level III functioning is the direct 
expression of anxiety 319} “
Persons at System 3 represent high levels of differentiation 
and interpersonal awareness, and yet they have not developed 
the integrative mechanisms with which to resolve perceived 
conflicts. Since, as previously suggested, persons with 
greater differentiation perceive more conflicting (and hence 
potentially threatening) stimuli, they are more prone to 
experience anxiety states, and thus should score high on 
measures of trait anxiety.
Thus, through System 3* theoretical relationships are 
highly consistent with the reported research results— anxiety 
and differentiation covary in a positive linear relationship. 
Furthermore, level of conceptual systems functioning seems to 
provide a theoretical explanation for this covariance. It is 
at the highest level of conceptual functioning that theory and 
research appear to diverge— i.e.t the positive linear relation­
ship may change„
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System 4 persons, as described earlier, seem to have 
as their most central characteristic an “integrated personality/* 
in the sense that this term has most recently been used (e.g., 
Loevinger, 1966; Maslpw, 1970, 1971; Rogers, 196V; Seeman,
1959)• Harvey et al. (1961) described System 4 persons as 
being characterised by a “strengthened capacity to face problems 
and to tolerate anxiety. The initial transition to the fourth 
stage may produce anxiety and worry ... but once the con­
ceptual system becomes stabilized, such reactions are much 
less likely* Therefore, the subject not only develops autono­
mous skills and informational standards for problem solution, 
but also a high degree of tolerance of anxiety and resistance 
to stress Jj). 108]]o“ Thus, the incidence of anxiety-proneness 
should be less among System 4 representatives*
Seeman*s (1959) concept of personality integration seems 
to be similar to the description of System 4 functioning and 
provides further support for a prediction of low trait anxiety 
in the integrated personality. Such persons have reported 
(Hearn & Seeman, 197.1) a significantly higher proportion of 
positive affect states than the normal population, indicating 
"that the psychologically integrated person sees his environ­
ment and the people around him as warm and safe, rather than 
as dangerous or threatening (p.
Personal turmoil and troubled states, then, increase with 
cognitive differentiation through System 3 and into System 4, 
but as System 4 stabilizes p such problems should become less 
associated with the integrated personality. In general, one
would expect trait anxiety to be highest in Systems 2 and 3 
and lowest in Systems 1 and 4*
To reiterate, the purposes of the present study were 
(a) to replicate the findings of Harvey, Reich, and Wyer 
(1968), using a modified version of Bierifs measure of differen­
tiation, and (b) to investigate the interrelationships among 
conceptual level, cognitive differentiation, and trait anxiety, 
replicating Wilkins, Epting, and Van De Riet (1972) and testing 
the expected theoretical relationship of CL to anxiety.
The following hypotheses related to these purposes were 
tested:
!• Cognitive differentiation increases as a positive 
function of conceptual level*
2* With regard to amount of cognitive differentiation, 
the effect due to intensity of regard is greater than the 
effect due to direction of regard.
3. Trait anxiety varies as a curvilinear function of 
conceptual level, with both Systems 2 and 3 being significantly 
higher in anxiety than Systems 1 and 4.
4. Independent of conceptual level, differentiation 
increases as a positive function of level or trait anxiety.
Method
Subjects.
A sample of 80 Ss was selected from a larger population 
of approximately 300 college students enrolled in several 
undergraduate and graduate courses at the University of
Nebraska at Omaha. As an initial subsample, approximately
2k
100 Ss were randomly selected on the basis of age, sex, and 
level of conceptual systems functioning as determined by 
Harveyes (1966) This-I«Believe (TIB) test (to be described). 
After testing and matching, a final sample of 80 Ss was con- 
st-rueted so that there were 20 representatives (10 males and 
10 females matched as closely as possible for age) from each 
of the four conceptual systems# All Ss participated in the 
study on a voluntary basis#
Measures#
Anxiety# Millimet's (1970) MAD scale was used as the
measure of trait anxiety# The MAD consists of 63 (form for 
/ *
males) or 59 (form for females) true-false items# Miliimet 
(1970) reported high test-retest reliability (.£=*♦ 95) satis­
factory construct validity for the MAD. High scores on the 
MAD are presumed to indicate high-anxious Ss, while low scores 
indicate low-anxious Ss (trait anxiety)#
The state anxiety portion of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, &Bushene, 1968) was 
used to check for possible variations in situational anxiety 
arousal among the Ss# Reliability and validity data on the 
STAI have been reported by Spielberger and Gorsuch (1966) and 
Spielberger et al# (1968)#
Cognitive differentiation# This dimension of cognitive 
structure was measured with Vannoy's (1965) modified version 
of the grid technique devised by Bieri (1961, 1966; Bieri et al., 
1966) to measure 1 interpersonal cognitive complexity# “ For 
this measure, Ss list the name of one person from their social 
environment to fit each of 10 specified role categories (e.g.,
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“mother," "person you like," "boss," etc.). Each of these 10 
persons is then rated on 10 bipolar personality constructs 
(e.g., "outgoing-shy"), using a six-point rating scale written 
beneath each construct. The rating scale ranges from Left-3 
to Right-3, with no zero-point (i.e., L3-2-1-1-2-3R). The 
rating chosen is intended to be the S1s estimate of where 
the person being rated falls on the construct continuum, e.g., 
more "outgoing" or more "shy." Among the bipolar constructs, 
the side on which the more desirable adjective (e.g., "out­
going") appears is counterbalanced.
The score for cognitive complexity is derived by comparing 
each rating with the one adjacent to it (i.e., for the same 
person) in the matrix. One point is scored for every pair 
of identical ratings. Since there are 45 possible row com­
parisons in the 10 x 10 matrix, 450 is the highest possible 
score. Such a score would indicate cognitive simplicity, as 
the S's use of the construct dimensions provides no basis for 
differentiation among persons in his environment. A person 
with a low score (e.g., 100) is considered to be relatively 
cognitively complex, due to his demonstrated greater differen­
tiation among persons in his environment.
The development of Bieri*s grid technique was summarized 
in Bieri (1955, 1961) arid Bieri et al. (1966). Vannoy (1965) 
reported a correlation coefficient of r=.64 (N=113) between 
his modified version and Bieri*s original measure.
Conceptual level. The relative concreteness-abstractness 
of the Ss* belief systems was measured with Harvey*s (1966)
TIB test. This test asks the S to write his reactions to the
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statement, "This I believe about r" the blank
being filled in successively by one of 10 concept referents, 
e.g., "the American way of life," "sin," "religion," etc.
The 10 statements are presented, one at a time, in a 
booklet format, with a two-minute time limit for each response. 
Subjects may be classified into one of four system types based 
on the "normativeness, absolutism, evaluativeness, entertain­
ment of alternatives, amount of information and attitudinal 
direction," along with other criteria as elaborated in numerous 
reports cited by Harvey et al. (1968). The four conceptual 
types represent the four principal belief systems or levels of 
abstractness posited by Harvey et al. (1961). Reliability and 
validity data on the TIB were reported by Cox (19 70) , Greaves 
(1971b), and Harvey (1966).
Responses were scored and system assignments made by two 
trained judges. An interscorer reliability coefficient of 
r=.88 was achieved by the two judges on the basis of a randomly 
selected sub-group (n=30) of the original sample.
Procedure.
Approximately 300 Ss were given the TIB in their classrooms 
in groups ranging from 10 to 150 people at one time. From this 
sample, an initial-subsample of approximately 100 Ss were con­
tacted by telephone and asked to participate in a one-hour 
testing session. Testing was accomplished in groups of 1 to 
5 Ss over a period of 3 to 4 weeks. Each £ completed, in order, 
the STAI, the MAD questionnaire, and the cognitive differentia­
tion measure.
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After the three tests were completed, the Ss were asked 
to perforin two further rating tasks on the role categories in 
the differentiation measure. The first rating procedure was re­
quired to negate possible ambiguities regarding the affective 
value of the S's attitude toward each stimulus person. In 
both Bieri®s original measure and Vannoy's modified version, 
the 10 specified role categories were the same, five being 
considered more "positive" stimuli and the five others being 
considered to be more"negative." Wilkins and Epting (1971) 
factor-analyzed these categories and found two factors which 
accounted for the largest proportion of the total score 
variance— one more positive and one more negative. However, the 
factor loadings of the role categories were not consistent 
with the usual dichotomy. Wilkins and Epting concluded that 
such a dichotomy should not be made without a check of their 
actual affective value.
Accordingly, the assignment of positive, neutral, and 
negative values to the role categories in the present study 
was accomplished by having the Ss rate their affective response 
to each stimulus person as compared to the 9 other persons by 
rank-ordering the 10 persons from most to least positive.
For each S , the top three instances were considered positive, 
the middle four neutral, and the bottom three negative. As 
a further check on the actual affective values, the Ss were 
instructed to place by each instance the appropriate symbol- 
positive (+), neutral (N), or negative (-)— -representing how 
they felt toward each person they had rated.
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Finally, an intensity measure was derived (cf., Harvey 
et al., 1968) by having Ss rate the intensity of their feeling 
toward each stimulus person on a 10-point scale, with 10 de­
fined as the "most intense" feeling that one can imagine any 
person having about anyone or anything else, regardless of 
whether they were used as stimulus persons in the test and 
regardless of the affective value of the attitude.
After all testing was completed for all Ss., the matching 
procedure for CL, age, and sex was applied to form the final 
sample of 80 Ss, as described previously.
Results
Preliminary analysis. In order to assess variations among 
Ss in state anxiety, a one-way analysis of variance was per­
formed with the four system types as the independent variable 
and scores on the state form of the State~Trait Anxiety In­
ventory (Spielberger et al., 1968) as the dependent variable. 
Mean state anxiety scores for the four systems are presented 
in Table II.
Insert Table II about here
The analysis found no significant differences between the 
four systems in state anxiety (F <1), indicating that variations 
in situational anxiety arousal were not sufficient to affect 
results of further analyses.
Differentiation as a function of CL, intensity, and 
regard. This first analysis was performed to test the pre­
dictions of Hypotheses 1 and 2 that (a) cognitive differentia-
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tion varies with conceptual level such that concrete Ss demon­
strate less differentiation than abstract Ss and (b) across 
all Ss, cognitive differentiation is a function of intensity 
of feelings rather than the positive, neutral, or negative 
regard of the stimuli persons.
In order to replicate as closely as possible the analysis 
of Harvey, Reich, and Wyer (1968), Ss were divided into concrete 
(Systems 1 and 2) and abstract (Systems 3 and 4) groups. Using 
the median intensity score, Ss were divided into high- and low- 
mean intensity groups. The criterion measure consisted of 
mean cognitive differentiation scores for each S at the three 
levels of regard (positive, neutral, and negative). Means 
and standard deviations of the resulting data are presented 
in Table III.
Insert Table III about here
These results were tested with a 2 x 2 x 3 analysis of 
variance for unequal N's with repeated measures on the last 
factor (regard). The unequal N*s resulted from the median split 
on intensity. Each S's mean intensity score was compared to 
the median intensity score of all responses to determine place­
ment in high- or low-mean intensity groups. The results of the 
analysis are summarized in Table IV.
Insert Table IV about here
Consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive differentiation 
varies positively with conceptual level, the main effect of
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concreteness-abstractness was statistically significant 
(F==3.25 , df=$/75, £ <.10) , indicating less differentiation by 
concrete Ss (X=28.96) than by abstract Ss (X~26.80).
The hypothesis that differentiation is affected more by 
intensity than by regard was not supported. The main effect 
for regard was statistically significant (F=2. 90, df-2/150,
£<T. 10) while the main effect of intensity accounted for only 
minor variability (F<1). Individual comparisons among the 
means of the three categories of regard indicated that posi­
tive stimuli (X=8f89) were differentiated significantly more 
than, neutral (X=9.45, t=1.88, .£<.10) and negative (X=9*56, 
t=2.24, £<.05) stimuli.
Anxiety as a function of CL. Hypothesis 3 predicted that 
trait anxiety would vary as a curvilinear function of conceptual 
level, with persons at Systems 2 and 3 exhibiting higher trait 
anxiety than persons at Systems 1 and 4. Means and standard 
deviations of the data for this analysis are summarized in 
Table V.
Insert Table V about here
A one-way analysis of variance was performed to assess 
variations in trait anxiety as a function of the four con­
ceptual systems* The analysis, including orthogonal polynomials, 
is summarized in Table VI,
Insert Table VI about here
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The results showed that trait anxiety varied as a function 
of system type (F=2.68, df=3/76, £<.10). More specifically, 
the linear trend was statistically significant (F=4.39, df- 
1/76, £<.05), the quadratic trend was not, and the cubic 
trend was also significant (F=3.61, df=l/76, p <,1Q).
These trends are represented graphically in Fig. 1.
Insert Fig. 1 about here
As the quadratic trend was not significant, Hypothesis
3 was not supported. The significant linear trend indicated 
that Systems 1 and 2 (concrete) Ss (K=21.85) showed greater 
trait anxiety than Systems 3 and 4 (abstract) Ss (X=14o975).
Differentiation as a function of trait anxiety. Hypothesis
4 predicted that regardless of conceptual level cognitive 
differentiation increases as a positive function of trait 
anxiety, so that persons high in trait anxiety should show 
more differentiation than persons low in trait anxiety.
In order to replicate the analysis of Wilkins, Epting, 
and Van De Riet (1972) , the 80 Ss were divided into three 
groups— high (sensitizers), medium (neutrals), and low (re­
pressors) trait anxiety— on the basis of their MAD scores.
Males whose MAD scorqs were above 32 and females whose scores 
were above 34 were classified as sensitizers (n=10), while 
males below 12 and females below 14 on the MAD were classified 
as repressors (n=30).^' Subjects whose scores fell between these 
points were classified as neutrals (n=40). Differentiation
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means and standard deviations for the three levels of trait 
anxiety are presented in Table VII.
Insert Table.VII about here
A one-way analysis of variance was performed with cog­
nitive differentiation as the dependent variable and level of 
trait anxiety as the independent variable. There were no 
significant differences among the three groups (F<1).
Discussion
It was expected that cognitive differentiation would in­
crease with conceptual level. This prediction was consistent 
with Conceptual Systems Theory (CST) as proposed by Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder (1961). It was also expected that inten­
sity would have a greater effect on differentiation than 
would regard. This hypothesis was derived from the results of 
a study by Harvey, Reich, and Wyer (1968},who found a highly 
significant intensity effect. They also found a significant 
regard effect, but their analysis showed that neutral stimuli 
were differentiated significantly more highly than either posi­
tive or negative stimuli, while the differentiation of positive 
and negative stimuli did not differ. From these results, Harvey 
et al. concluded "that the direction of attitudes toward stimuli 
is not an important determinant of ... differentiation [J968, 
p. 477]" They also cited significant intensity x concreteness- 
abstractness and intensity x regard interaction effects.
In the present study, significant effects were noted for 
concreteness-abstractness and regard. Although not significant
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in the Harvey et al. study, the concreteness-abstractness 
effect is consistent with the theoretical predictions of CST 
(i.e., concrete persons are less differentiated than abstract 
persons; Harvey> 1966; Harvey?et al., 1961) and the hypothesis 
of the present study. On the other hand, the regard effect 
was present while the intensity effect was not, a reversal 
of the predicted relationship in Hypothesis 2.
Both studies (Harvey et al., 1968 and the present study) 
found a significant effect for regard. However, individual 
comparisons in the two instances produced different results. 
Harvey et al. found that neutral stimuli were differentiated 
significantly better than both positive and negative stimuli, 
while positive stimuli were differentiated better than both 
neutral and negative stimuli in the present study. This re­
sult seriously contradicts the bulk of research concerning 
affect and cognitive differentiation. As reported previously, 
this research has demonstrated that negative stimuli typically 
elicit more differentiation than positive stimuli. Yet Supnick 
(1964) demonstrated the opposite effect, that positive stimuli 
(liked persons) were more easily differentiated than negative 
stimuli (disliked persons). Irwin, Tripodi, and Bieri (1967) 
paid little notice to Supnick*s results, suggesting that the 
difference was probably due to the fact that a different measure 
of cognitive complexity was used. The present study supports 
Supnick*s finding and represents the only reported evidence 
of positive stimuli eliciting better differentiation on Bieri*s 
measure. This result only serves to further confuse the issue 
of the effect of regard. The equivocal nature of such research
3^leads again to consideration of the possible effects of 
intensity.
In addition to the absence of a significant main effect 
for intensity dm the present study, a closer analysis revealed 
a further contradiction. An examination of the mean intensity 
levels of the three categories of regard showed that positive 
(X=8.36) stimuli were regarded more intensely than both neu­
tral (X=6.07) and negative (X-4.57) stimuli. Assuming that 
intensity is the relevant variable as argued by Harvey et al., 
(1968), then the fact that positive stimuli were better differen­
tiated than negative stimuli might be explained by the higher 
level of intensity for the positive category. However:, the 
results of the Harvey et al. study indicated that differentia­
tion should be better under low- than high-intensity conditions.
These contradictory results were possibly due to several 
design problems which arose in trying to replicate the rather 
complex design of Harvey et al., who usdd an entirely different 
measure of cognitive differentiation. The measure they used 
required Ss to choose eight stimuli in each of the three cate­
gories of regard. This procedure assured a representative 
range and an equal number of stimuli within each category of 
regard. The present study attempted an adaptation of Bieri1s 
measure of cognitive differentiation to the design used by 
Harvey et al., so that a more direct comparison could be made 
with research using Bieri1s test.
Problems encountered with this adaptation resulted in 
procedural differences which might preclude an accurate com­
parison of the results of the present study with those of
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Harvey et al. The most important problems involved (a) the 
method of determining the stimuli in each category of regard 
and (b) the technique used to elicit intensity ratings.
Previous research with Bieri's measure (e.g., Irwin et al., 
1367; Wilkins et al.f 1972) had assigned arbitrary designations 
of affect (regard) to the stimuli (predetermined role categories) 
and included only positive and negative categories. As noted 
previously, Wilkins and Epting (1971) reported a study indicating 
that these arbitrary designations are not accurate representations 
of the S*s feelings. In the present study, two procedures were 
used to assign regard categories to the stimuli. The first 
technique was the ranking procedure described in the Method 
section. A second procedure was to have S. indicate his
t
affective response to each stimulus person by placing a (^),
(N), or (-) beside each one. This procedure, while providing 
a more accurate appraisal of each S's affective responses, re­
sulted in a different number of items in each category of regard 
for every S. Some Ss had no neutral and/or negative ratings 
at all and thus had to be dropped from any subsequent analysis.
To compare the two procedures, a post hoc analysis of 
variance was performed on the data from the latter sample 
(N=55). As in the original analysis, the only significant 
effects were for concreteness-abstractness (F=6.66, df-1/51, 
£<.05) and regard (F=3.53, df=2/10 2, £<.05). These results 
suggest that the two procedures are comparable for Bieri*s 
measure. The ranking procedure is probably the most desirable
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of the two since it allows use of the entire sample in any 
subsequent analysis.
Compared to the differentiation measure used by Harvey 
et al.,. Bieri's test has an important shortcoming. The range 
of regard is fixed for Bieri's measure, since the role cate­
gories are predetermined. In contrast, the Harvey et al. 
method assures a wider range of stimuli within and across 
categories of regard.
In addition, since there are fewer stimuli in each category 
of regard on Bieri's measure, and since all 10 role cate­
gories represent significant persons in a £'s social environ­
ment, the range of intensity scores is also smaller.
A further problem with the ranking procedure may have pro** 
duced the conflicting results noted previously for the intensity 
effect. After Ss rank-ordered the stimuli and recorded their 
specific affective reactions, they were asked to rate the in­
tensity of those reactions. All three ranking and rating tasks 
were performed on the same form so that the affective and inten­
sity ratings were recorded alongside the 10 rank-ordered stimuli. 
It is thus possible that the explicit order effect was responsible 
for the intensity ratings being confounded with the level of 
regard rankings. The mean intensity scores noted previously 
for the three categories of regard support this possibility—  
positive stimuli were highest in intensity, followed by neutral 
and negative stimuli, in that order. It is also possible that 
the restricted range of stimuli in Bieri's test affected these 
intensity levels.
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The problems with the intensity ratings may also have 
precluded a significant concreteness-abstractness x intensity 
interaction as found by Harvey et al. The hypothesis of the 
Harvey et al. study was that concrete Ss would demonstrate 
better differentiation under low-intensity conditions, while 
abstract Ss would demonstrate better differentiation under 
high-intensity conditions.
In a recent study, Miller and Harvey (1973) sought con­
firmation of a similar hypothesized interaction between con­
creteness-abstractness and state anxiety, using several intel­
lectual and motor tasks as the criterion variables and using 
only System 1 and System 4 Ss as the concrete and abstract 
groups. The overall results of their study failed to demon­
strate the hypothesized interaction, and they found no main 
effect for anxiety. Miller and Harvey suggested that their 
results could most likely be explained by the restricted range 
of state anxiety scores in their sample. The results of the 
present study are consistent with their findings, as state 
anxiety did not vary across conceptual levels. Moreover, 
differences between individual pairs of systems in state 
anxiety were least between Systems 1 and 4.
To test Harvey's interaction hypothesis, a second post 
hoc analysis was performed on the data from the present study, 
using concreteness-abstractness and low and high trait anxiety 
(determined by a median split) as the independent variables and 
cognitive differentiation as the dependent variable in a 2 x 2 
analysis of variance. The hypothesized interaction between
concreteness-abstractness and trait anxiety was statistically 
significant (F=3.33, df=1/81, £ <.10) , with high-anxious 
concrete Ss (X=106„0) exhibiting less differentiation than 
low-anxious concrete Ss (X=92.72), while high-anxious abstract 
Ss (X=87.94) were more differentiated than low-anxious abstract 
Ss (X=92.86). The main effect for concreteness-abstractness 
was also significant (F=5.24, df=l/81 , £ <'.025) , again support­
ing Hypothesis 1.
These results provide further support for Harvey's inter­
action hypothesis. Concrete Ss who tend to be adversely affected 
by anxiety arousing situations are more cognitively simple than
I
low-anxious concrete Ss, while abstract Ss higher in anxiety- 
proneness are more differentiated than their low-anxious counter­
parts .
It is interesting to note that low-anxious concrete and 
abstract Ss have almost identical mean differentiation scores, 
while the two high-anxious groups show the largest difference 
and thus account for both the interaction effect and the main 
effect for concreteness-abstractness. This finding may indi­
cate that for abstract Ss higher trait anxiety maintains a 
facilitating function, while for concrete Ss high anxiety 
maintains a debilitating influence on cognitive complexity.
Of course, any causal relationship between trait anxiety and 
cognitive differentiation cannot be inferred from the results 
of this study. All of the tests used in the present study 
purport to measure relatively stable cognitive or attitudinal 
personality characteristics. Further investigations should
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involve the study of these characteristics as predictor 
variables using behavioral criteria such as performance on 
intellectual and motor tasks like those used by Miller and 
Harvey.
Another result of the present study was that the prediction 
that trait anxiety varies curvilinearly with conceptual level 
was not supported. Rather, the significant trend was mainly 
linear, with concrete Ss being higher in trait anxiety than 
abstract Ss. The hypothesis was primarily extrapolated from 
theoretical discussions of Conceptual Systems Theory and some 
empirical results relating trait anxiety to cognitive differen­
tiation. Given the contradictory results, several flaws 
appear in the logic of the derived hypothesis. One problem 
involves the definition of trait anxiety. Another problem 
concerns the use of the TIB as a measure of CL.
In Conceptual Systems Theory (CST), as discussed by 
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder,(1961), mention is made of anxiety 
in relation to the four system types. These discussions 
logically led to the predictions of a curvilinear function. 
However, it now appears likely that the experiences termed 
"anxiety" by CST are probably not the same experiences denoted 
by Millimet, Spielberger, Taylor, and others when they speak 
of trait anxiety. Thus, the predictions of this atudy might 
have been more accurate had they been more firmly based on a 
clear understanding of the operational definition of trait 
anxiety as measured by the MAD scale. It is possible that the 
predicted relationships do occur between conceptual level,
40
differentiation, and an experience of anxiety quite different 
from the trait anxiety measured in this study. It may be that 
some form of anxiety is associated with abstract, integrated 
persons, as suggested by Harvey's interaction hypothesis.
Indeed, one abstract £ (a representative of System 4), while 
beginning to complete the state anxiety questionnaire, commented, 
"You may get contradictory answers here. I may put that I feel 
both calm and tense. I'm calm when I feel taut and tensed-u]b; 
then I know that I'm ready to goI" This comment suggests that, 
for this abstract person, the feeling of tenseness has a facili­
tating function.
It appears, then , that a useful approach to the prob­
lem of the relationships between these variables might be to 
distinguish at least two types of trait anxiety, one type more 
facilitating for the person and the other type more debilitating. 
Such a distinction was made by Alpert and Haber (1960) in their 
Achievement Anxiety Test (AAT). Watson (1967) reported a 
correlation of .46 (N=648, £ <. 01) between the debilitating 
scale of the AAT and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), 
and a correlation of -.19 (N=648, £ <.01) between the MAS and 
the facilitating scale of the AAT. Using such an interpreta­
tion, the MAD could be considered a measure, of debilitating 
anxiety, and scores on it would be expected to decrease as 
conceptual level increases. Because of the low correlation 
associated with facilitating anxiety, a measure of this type 
may be more consistent with the hypothesis originally stated 
between anxiety and conceptual level.
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Another problem relating to the contradictory results 
concerns a measurement property of the TIB test. The typical 
scoring procedure places each S into one of four system types 
or into a "mixed" category. In this study, only representa­
tives of the four "pure" system types were selected for the 
final sample. The overall mean MAD score for the final sample 
was 18.41, lower than the usual norm means reported by Milli- 
met. If the original sample can be considered a normal one, 
then those not tested in the final sample (primarily "mixes") 
should have higher trait anxiety scores. This possibility 
suggests that a better research design might be to include a 
fifth group of 20 Ss—  all mixes.
However, the use of mixes also presents difficulties.
The problem is that, of all five groups, the mixed group ie 
the most heterogeneous. In scoring the TIB protocols, scorers 
are instructed to look for "pure" system types by making an 
overall intuitive judgment of each person*s responses. Atten­
tion must be paid, however, to major divergences from a consis­
tent representation of one type 6f response. In such cases, 
the protocol is assigned a mixed designation, with numbers 
combined to represent the primary response tendencies. So 
you may have many different kjmds of mixes, e.g., 1-2,1-4,
2-1, 2-3, 2-4, etc.
All such scores fall into the mixed category. Also, there 
are certain individuals whose protocols must be assigned this 
mixed designation, but whose overall responses clearly indicate 
a person in transition from one conceptual system to the next
highest one* Most reported research with the TIB excludes 
these mixed Ss. This represents a major problem for research 
with Harvey's measure. Though it would seem reasonable to 
find some way of including the mixes in future analyses, a 
more refined scoring procedure needs to be worked out to 
better differentiate people in that category.
Although not supporting the predictions of the present
study, the relationship of trait anxiety to conceptual level
reported here with only the four system types appears quite
reasonable in light of some related studies. System level on
the TIB has been shown to be related to Rotter's (1966) Internal-
External (I-E) Locus of Control Scale, with abstract Ss having
a more internal locus of control while concrete Ss have a more 
■»
external one. Watson (1967) reported a positive correlation 
between the I-E scale and the MAS (r=.36, N=648, £ <.01) , i.e., 
higher scores on the I-E scale (indicating externality) tend 
to correspond with higher scores on trait anxiety. Furthermore, 
dogmatism-— a functional aspect of concrete belief systems 
(Harvey et al., 1961)— has been shown to be positively related 
to Byrne's R-S scale (r=.44, N«138, £<.001} Byrne, Blaylock,
& Goldberg, 1966), i.e., dogmatism tends to be associated with 
sensitization (high trait anxiety). Harvey (1966) reported 
a Negative relationship between Rokeach's (1960) Dogmatism 
Scale and conceptual level, i.e., System 1 Ss scored highest 
on dogmatism, followed by Systems 2, 3, and 4. Thus, these 
studies demonstrate empirical and conceptual linkages corroborating 
the results of the present study that concrete Ss are more
prone to trait anxiety than abstract Ss.
It had also been predicted that cognitive differentiation 
would vary positively with level of trait anxiety, so that low 
scorers should be less differentiated than high scorers. Con­
trary to this hypothesis and the results of Wilkins et al.
(19 72), the present study found no differences in the cogni­
tive differentiation of persons at low, medium, and high levels 
of trait anxiety. The results of Wilkins et al. (1972) and 
the results of the present study are compared in Fig. 2.
Insert Fig. 2 about here
In addition to the fact that there was no significant 
change across the three levels in the present study, another 
striking difference that is readily observahle in Fig. 2 is 
the much lower overall scores on differentiation in this 
study. Two major differences in the two studies may account 
for the varying results: (a) different sample populations and 
(b) different forms of Bieri's test.
The present study considered a carefully selected sample 
intended to be representative of the range of conceptual 
complexity, with 40 males and 40 females matched as closely as 
possible for age. Unfortunately, Wilkins et al. did not report 
the age or sex of Ss in their sample, stating only that they 
were "undergraduates enrolled in either child or abnormal 
psychology courses." It is thus difficult to assess differences 
between the two samples.
Assuming no major difference in the sample populations, the 
crucial factor may well have been the use of a modified version 
of Bieri's test in the present study. More specifically, a 
possible explanation involves the effects of social desirability 
on the two tests. As reported, Vannoy's modified version was 
used in-this study to try to reduce the confounding effects of 
socially desirable response sets on the relationship between 
cognitive differentiation and trait anxiety scores. Since, 
as previously noted, repressors score highest in social desira­
bility, one would expect any reduction in such confounding to 
have the most effect on their scores. As is readily observable 
in Fig. 2, the greatest difference in the two studies did occur 
for repressors. Such a difference is logically consistent 
with Bieri's scoring system, since socially desirable response 
sets should produce greater agreement among ratings and thus 
higher total scores, indicating more simplicity. So the re­
moval of social desirability should lower the scores of repressors 
with little effect on sensitizers. The net result is the dis­
appearance of differences between the two groups.
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FOOTNOTES
1* Unpublished study entitled, “The Person-Object Dimension 
in Interpersonal Perception," 1972.
2® Unpublished norms for the MAD scale® Private communica­
tion, C. B. Millimet, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 
1973®
3® Unpublished data from concurrent research® K» Jackson & 
G. Brennan, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1973*
TABLE I
Group Mean Interpersonal Cognitive 
Complexity Scores for,R~S Levels
R-S level
Positive
role
category
Negative
role
category
Total
score
Level 1 (Sensitizers) 68.3 59.2 127.5
Level 2 (Neutrals) 7^.8 63.9 138.7
Level 3 (Repressors) 89.8 67.1 156.9
Note.— Reprinted from an article by Greg Wilkins, Franz 
Epting, and Hani Van De Riet published in the J ournal of Con­
sulting and Clinical Psychology. Volume 39* No. 3* 1972. 
Copyrighted by the American Psychological Association, Inc., 
1972.
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TABLE II 
Means and Standard Deviations 
of State Anxiety on the 
Four Conceptual Levels
State Anxiety
Conceptual Level
X SD n
I 34.25 8.16 20
2 37.90 10.59 20
3 32.30 9.36 20
4 34.45 8.74 20
59
TABLE III 
Means and Standard Deviations 
of Cognitive Differentiation 
on Conceptual Level, 
Intensity, and Regard
Conceptual Intensity Regard
Level Positive Neutral Negative
High X 9.687 9.833 9.980
SD 2.410 3.090 2.737
Concrete
n 24 24 24
Low X 8.480 9.813 9.856
SD 1.677 2.520 2.726
n 16 16 16
High X 8.325 8.450 8.871
SD 2/070 1.690 1.423
Abstract
n 22 22 22
Low X 8.902 9.838 9.548
SD 1.730 2.801 2.221
n 17 17 17
Note—  One abstract S failed to complete the intensity 
portion of the differentiation task and thus could not be 
included in this analysis.
60
\
TABLE IV
An Analysis of Variance of Cognitive 
Differentiation Scores for Intensity, 
Concreteness-Abstractness, and Regard
Source SS df MS F
Between 768.73 78
Intensity (A) 2.04 1 2.04
Concreteness-Abstractness (B) 30.74 1 30.74 3.25*
A x B 26.13 1 26.13 2.76
Ss within groups
(error between)
Within 542.57 158
Regard (C) 19.72 2 9.86 2.90*
A x C 9.55 2 4.77 1.40
B x C 0.25 2 0.13
A x B x C 2.48 2 1.24
C x Ss within groups 510.57 150 3.40
(error within)
*£<.10
TABLE . V
Means and Standard Deviations for Trait Anxiety 
on the Four Conceptual Levels
Sex
Conceptual Level
1 2 3 4
Hales
X 21.07 18.45 9.08 13.67
SD 14.90 11.61 6.33 8.13
n 10 10 10 10
Females
X 18.90 26.30 18.70 16.90
SD 11/56 12.23 11.78 10.50
n 10 10 10 10
Combined
X 20.70 23.00 14.20 15.75
SD 13.12 12.09 10.29 9.22
n 20 20 20 20
Note.— Since male and female MAD forms have different 
numbers of items (63 and 59, respectively), mean MAD scores 
for males were multiplied by the proportion 59/6 3 to make 
them comparable to the female means.
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TABLE. VI
An Analysis of Variance and Trend Analysis of 
Trait Anxiety Scores for 
the Four Conceptual Systems
Source SS df MS F
Total 1069 7c39 79
Between 1022.23 3 340.75 2.68*
Linear 559.32 1 559.32 4.39**
Quadratic 2.81 1 2.81
Cubic 460.10 1 460.10 3.61*
Within groups (error) 9675.15 76 127.30
*£ <.10 
**£ <.05
TABLE VII
Means and Standard Deviations of Cognitive 
Differentiation Scores for Three Levels of 
Trait Anxiety
Trait Anxiety Cognitive Differentiation
X SD n
Low .(Repressors) 92.730 19.67 30
Medium (Neutrals) 95.075 18.95 40
High (Sensitizers) 104.500 28.20 10
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Fig. 2
A Comparison of Cognitive Differentiation 
Scores from Wilkins et al. and the Present Study 
as a Function of Trait Anxiety
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Note—  19 72 data from an article by Greg Wilkins, Franz
Epting, and Hani Van De Riet published in the Journal of Con­
sulting and Clinical Psychology, Volume 39, No. 3, 1972. 
Copyrighted by the American Psychological Association, Inc., 
1972.
